Xingzhang Chen v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-9-2012 
Xingzhang Chen v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Xingzhang Chen v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1025. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1025 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3390 
___________ 
 
XINGZHANG CHEN, a/k/a Xing Zhang Chen; 
SHUYU LU, a/k/a Shu Yu Lu, 
Petitioners 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A89-908-498 and A77-845-636) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 4, 2012 
Before:  FISHER, WEIS and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2012) 
. 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Petitioners, Xingzhang Chen and his wife, Shuyu Lu, seek review of a decision by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeals from denial of asylum, 
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withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  For the 
reasons that follow, we deny their petition for review. 
 Xingzhang Chen and his wife, Shuyu Lu, (the “Petitioners”) are citizens of China 
who have been in the United States since 1999 and 2000, respectively.  They married 
while in this country and now have two children who were born in the United States.  
I. 
Each Petitioner conceded removability.  Petitioner Chen applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 
sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13, 
1208.16 - .18, with his wife as an intended beneficiary under his application.   Because 
Petitioner Lu’s claims are derivative of her husband’s, the success of her application 
relies upon her husband establishing his entitlement to protection. 
Petitioner Chen’s application is predicated upon his fear that, because of his 
resistance to China’s family planning policies, he will be persecuted if he is returned to 
China; specifically, Chen fears that because he had two children while in the United 
States, he or his wife will be forcibly sterilized and/or  that he will be required to pay a 
large fine upon returning to China with his family.  
Petitioners’ applications were heard by an Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) who found 
that although Chen was a credible witness, the record as a whole did not establish that 
either he or his wife faces a reasonable possibility of being forcibly sterilized or 
otherwise persecuted upon return to China. The IJ therefore denied both applications.    
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Petitioners timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(the “BIA”).  The BIA dismissed Petitioners’ appeals, holding in its own written opinion 
that the record developed failed to establish Chen’s entitlement to asylum, failed to 
satisfy the more stringent requirements for his withholding of removal, and failed to 
demonstrate his eligibility for protection under the CAT.  In addition, the BIA denied 
what it construed to be Petitioners’ motion to reopen based upon new evidence, 
determining Petitioners had failed to demonstrate that the new evidence would likely 
change the result of the case.  Petitioners timely sought review from this Court and 
moved to stay the BIA ruling pending review.   We previously denied the motion for stay 
and now deny the petition for review. 
This Court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001).  In this instance, 
because the BIA issued its own opinion on the merits, we review its decision rather than 
that of the IJ.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, to the 
extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning, we also look to and consider the 
decision of the IJ on those points.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
II. 
We review the factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, see 
Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007), upholding them “unless 
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any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B); see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  
Legal conclusions, including applications of law to undisputed facts of record, are 
reviewed de novo.  See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 2006).    In 
summary, when “reviewing decisions of the BIA, this Court applies a deferential standard 
of review. … So long as the BIA’s decision is supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,’ we will not disturb the BIA’s 
disposition of the case.” Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 515 (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacaris, 502 
U.S. 478, 481(1992)).  The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard, see Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 143, 146 (3d Cir. 2008).   
     
 The BIA’s opinion reveals that it undertook a thorough review of Petitioners’ 
claims and the evidence of record.  The agency’s resolution of the appeals is reasoned 
and supported by substantial evidence.  Even assuming Chen was a credible witness in 
testifying to his genuine fear of persecution, and thereby satisfying the first, subjective 
component of the “well-founded fear of persecution” test, see Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 
346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008), the facts of record do not establish the required second, objective 
component of the test, namely that his fear of persecution is objectively reasonable, id.    
III. 
Petitioners’ evidence of record, because of disparate infirmities (in some instances 
lack of any authentication, in some instances relating to differing circumstances, in some 
instances lacking indicia of trustworthiness etc.) may best be characterized as raising only 
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speculation of potential adverse actions, of undetermined severity, by the Chinese 
authorities.  Evidence presented in opposition to Petitioners’ applications, properly 
considered and weighed by the BIA, magnifies the speculative nature of Petitioners’ own 
case.   Such a record does not satisfy Petitioners’ burdens on any of their claims. 
In seeking review, Petitioners first argue that the BIA incorrectly reviewed their 
evidence under a de novo standard instead of the clearly erroneous standard.   However, 
at the beginning of its opinion, the BIA stated that it reviewed findings of fact and 
credibility under the clearly erroneous standard, and applied a de novo standard to 
remaining issues, including whether the burden of proof is met and issues of discretion.  
That is the correct approach and presents no error.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 
260, 268 (3d Cir. 2010); Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 Petitioners next argue that the BIA considered evidence in the record in a 
selective and arbitrary manner.  They maintain that the BIA relied excessively on State 
Department reports, see, e.g., Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004), and 
discounted other evidence for arbitrary reasons.   In a similar vein, Petitioners assert that 
the BIA engaged in improper fact finding when reviewing the documentary evidence they 
submitted.   Petitioners’ arguments are not well founded. 
The BIA’s opinion in this instance, unlike that in Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 
372, 388-89 (3d Cir. 2010) relied upon by Petitioners (wherein this Court held the BIA 
may not ignore evidence favorable to an alien and must do more than “cherry-pick” a few 
pieces of evidence), indicates that the Board undertook a thorough review of the entire 
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record.   The BIA properly considered and weighed State Department reports which 
provided evidence contradicting  Petitioners’ claim that their fear of persecution is 
objectively reasonable, see Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d at 349 (State Department reports 
may constitute substantial evidence), but the BIA also gave close consideration of  the 
evidence submitted by Petitioners.   It considered the documents they submitted from 
China (including, among others, an unsigned, unauthenticated notice from the “Villagers’ 
Committee” regarding family planning policy and sanctions for violation of the policy 
and letters from family members recounting their own forced sterilization and fines for 
violations of the family planning policy).  However, as the BIA’s opinion explains in 
detail, because the record reflects that such documents were either unauthenticated or 
lacked minimal indicia of trustworthiness, detailed the circumstances of individuals not 
similarly situated, and/or were from interested witnesses who were unavailable for cross-
examination, the BIA gave them less weight in its consideration of Petitioners’ 
applications.   
While we have held that failure to authenticate under 8 C.F.R. § 287.6 does not 
warrant “per se exclusion of documentary evidence, and a petitioner is permitted to prove 
authenticity in another manner,” the BIA correctly held that Petitioners’ failure to 
authenticate certain of their evidence in any manner undermines its evidentiary value.  
Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005).  Further, statements from other 
family members in China regarding their own experiences after having children in China 
were based on dissimilar circumstances   from those of Petitioners.  Accordingly, the 
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BIA’s decision (like that of the IJ) to accord little weight to such evidence is reasonable 
and presents no error.  
 Moreover, as the BIA correctly noted, although Petitioners raised the specter of 
economic persecution by Chinese authorities, they failed to present evidence that Chen 
faced economic sanctions “so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  Petitioners did not, for instance, provide 
any evidence other than Chen’s personal estimate as to any potential fine for an 
individual in his circumstances.  
Petitioners contend that BIA precedent does not preclude them from asylum 
eligibility based on their United States-born children.    The BIA, however, did not hold 
that Petitioners were precluded from establishing eligibility, but ruled rather that they had 
failed to establish that there is a reasonable possibility Chen or his wife will be forcibly 
sterilized or otherwise persecuted for having had children without permission while in the 
United States. 
As Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof for entitlement to asylum, they 
failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  
See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Likewise, the record does 
not support their claim for CAT protection.  See id. at 182-83.   
Finally, Petitioners contend the BIA abused its discretion in denying their motion 
for remand.  The BIA properly interpreted Petitioners’ motion as a motion to reopen.  See 
IV. 
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Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005).  As noted above, we review the 
BIA’s denial of the motion for abuse of discretion.  Id.; see also Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 
F.3d 143, 146 (3d Cir. 2008).   
In support of their motion, Petitioners submitted an unsworn statement from a 
Chinese citizen who recounts that after being removed to China he was forcibly sterilized 
as a sanction for having had two children while in the United States.  Petitioners maintain 
that the BIA erred in failing to reopen the proceedings for consideration of such new 
evidence.  
As noted by the BIA, the statement proffered by Petitioners was unsworn, 
unnotarized, reflected facts particular to another individual which may not be 
representative of Petitioners’ circumstances, and may have been made for the purposes of 
litigation.  Consequently, the BIA concluded that the Board could not be certain of the 
declarant’s identity, “much less the reliability of the substance contained” in the 
statement.   On that basis, we find the BIA acted within its discretion in finding the 
statement to be of insufficient evidentiary value to change the outcome of the case and in 
denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen.   See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556,  563 & n.7 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 
 
 
 
